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Can a Private Educational Association ever be
Liable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for
Depriving an Individual of Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Rights after NCAA
v.Tarkanian?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits a
state from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. "1 A deprivation of these rights, under color of state law, gives rise to a private cause of action
under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
was enacted by Congress in 1871.2 In recent history many individuals have sought relief under section 1983.
Jerry Tarkanian, the respondent in NCAA v. Tarkanian,
was one such individual. In Tarkanian, however, the Supreme
Court ruled, in a five to four decision, that there is no cause of
action under § 1983 when the alleged violation of a constitutional right was caused by a non-state actor not acting under
the color of state law. 3
A claim under § 1983 must satisfy two requirements: (1)
the action causing the alleged constitutional violation must be
committed by a person acting under color of state law;4 and (2)

1.
2.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Section 1983 reads in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the other party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other prop·
er proceeding for redress.
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982).
3.
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, at 199 (1990).
See Burton v. Wilmington Packing Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (As a
4.
general matter the protections of the fourteenth amendment do not extend to
"private conduct abridging individual rights."); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 172 (1961) (§ 1983 gives a remedy for violation of fourteenth amendment
when it occurs "under color of" state law, therefore liability only attaches to those
wrongdoers "who carry a badge of authority of a state and represent it in some
capacity, whether they act in accordance [with] their authority or misuse it.").
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the conduct must in fact deprive the individual of a constitutional right. In Tarkanian, the second prong was never really
considered since the first requirement proved to be the central
issue in the case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether a private actor 'Qecomes a state actor when
the state actor follows the prompting of the private actor.
Part II of this Note presents the facts of Tarkanian. Part
III discusses the reasoning of Tarkanian's majority and dissenting opinions. Parts IV and V analyze Tarkanian, and attempt
to propose a guideline for non-state unincorporated educational
associations wishing to limit their liability under § 1983.
II.

FACTS OF TARKANIAN

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is an
unincorporated association of 960 public and private universities and colleges from across the country. 5 Its function is to
adopt rules governing member institutions' recruiting, admissions, academic eligibility, and financial aid standards for student athletes.6 The NCAA's Committee on Infractions conducts
investigations, makes factual determinations, and is expressly
authorized to impose penalties upon member institutions which
have violated the rules. 7 The NCAA, however, is not authorized to penalize its member's employees directly. 8
The NCAA, after a long investigation, found that the University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) had committed 38 violations.9 It also found that Jerry Tarkanian had committed ten
of the 38 violations personally. 10 In 1977, UNLV informed
Tarkanian that it was going to suspend him in accordance with
the findings and suggestions of the NCAA. 11 UNLV suspended
Tarkanian after being notified by the NCAA that UNLV would
have to show cause why further penalties should not be imposed upon the University if it failed to suspend Tarkanian for
a probationary period. 12

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

488 U.S. at 183.
Id.
!d.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 186.
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Faced with a serious demotion, a drastic cut in salary and
loss of other substantial monetary benefits, 13 Tarkanian filed
suit in Nevada state court claiming that he had been deprived
of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 14 The trial court found that Tarkanian had
been deprived of his due process rights by a state actor (the
NCAA) and awarded him an injunction from the suspension. 16
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision
in relevant part, fmding that the NCAA engaged in state action
when it conducted its investigation and recommended that
Tarkanian be disciplined. 16 The United States Supreme Court
then granted certiorari and reversed. 17
III.

THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING IN TARKANIAN

With the facts of Tarkanian set fort in part II, the purpose
of this part will be to discuss the reasoning of both the majority
and dissenting opinions of Tarkanian.

Reasoning of the Majority

A.

Justice Stevens wrote on behalf of the five member majority. He began with a discussion of what constitutes a state
actor for purposes of § 1983 and concluded that the NCAA was
not a state actor. Justice Stevens reasoned that UNLV played
only a small part in the creation of the NCAA's rules, and neither UNLV's following of the NCAA's suggestion to suspend
Tarkanian nor the NCAA's great persuasive power over UNLV
transformed the NCAA from a private party into a state actor.
18

13.
Id. at 181 n.1, The trial court found that Tarkanian, as head basketball
coach:
...is annually paid (in lieu of his salary as a professor) $125,000, plus
10% of the net proceeds received by UNLV for participation in
NCAA-authorized championship games, plus fees from basketball camps
and clinics, product endorsements, and income realized from writing a
newspaper column, speaking on a radio program entitled 'THE JERRY
TARKANIAN SHOW,' and appearing on a television program bearing the
same name. As a tenured professor alone, he would have earned about
$53,000.
Id.
14.
15.
Id.
16.
Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987).
17.
488 U.S. at 182.
18.
Chief Justice Rehnquist along with Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy
joined the majority opinion. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 180 (1990).
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1. An unincorporated association made up of member institutions from a large number of states is not a state actor for purposes of42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Justice Stevens noted that the rules promulgated by
the NCAA could not be considered Nevada State law. Although
UNLV, a state actor, had a small part in the formation of the
rules by virtue of its membership in the NCAA, the great majority of member institutions were from other states. Therefore,
it follows that the legislation created by the NCAA is "not the
product of Nevada," but rather the result of "the collective
membership, speaking through an organization that is independent of any particular state. "19 Stevens concluded that the
NCAA was a private actor originally, and that only by some
other theory could it have been transformed into a state actor.20

2. A private actor becomes a state actor if a state actor formally delegates authority to the private actor which enables it to
conduct itself in a way that deprives an individual of due process.
The Court next dealt with Tarkanian's first claim that
UNLV delegated its functions to the NCAA, clothing the Association with authority to both adopt the rules governing
UNLV's athletic programs and to enforce those rules on behalf
ofUNLV.
Stevens first noted that the typical case raising a
state-action issue involves a private party who has taken decisive steps to deprive an individual of his or her due process
rights. In such a case, the issue becomes whether the state was
sufficiently involved to treat the decisive conduct as state action. 21 The test in the usual case is "whether the state provided a mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the
harm-causing individual actor."22
19.
Id. at 193; see also Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n., 695 F.2d 1126
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Louisiana High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968).
20.
488 U.S. at 193 n.13 (However, Stevens noted that the result would be dif.
ferent for a private organization with a membership made up primarily of actors
from the same state).
21.
Id. at 192.
Id. n.12; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)
22.
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However, Stevens pointed out that "this case uniquely
mirrors the traditional state-action case. "23 For in Tarkanian,
it was not the private party (the NCAA) that ultimately suspended Tarkanian, it was the state actor (UNLV). The question
thus becomes "not whether UNLV participated to a critical
extent in the NCAA's activities, but whether UNLV's actions in
compliance with the NCAA's rules and recommendations
turned the NCAA's conduct into state action."24 Stevens answered this question in the negative, fmding that "UNLV delegated no power to the NCAA to take specific action against any
university employee."25 Rather, "the commitment by UNLV to
adhere to NCAA enforcement procedures was enforceable only
by sanctions that the NCAA might impose against UNLV itself. "26 Thus, Stevens concluded that UNLV was a state actor
in its suspension of Tarkanian, but that the NCAA was not.
Though the NCAA threatened further penalties if the suspension wasn't made, UNLV made the ultimate decision. UNLV
could have, if it had wished, refused to follow the recommendations of the NCAA to suspend Tarkanian and risked further
penalties. 27

3. A state's conferral of monopoly status does not convert a
private party into a state actor.
Finally, Tarkanian argued that the power of the NCAA is
so great that UNLV had no practical alternative other than to
comply with the NCAA's demands. In response, Stevens first
expressed doubt as to whether this claim was even true, 28 but
concluded that even if it were, it would not follow that the
NCAA became a state actor. In final analysis, Stevens found
the issue to be whether "the conduct allegedly causing the
deprivation of a federal right [can] fairly be attributable to the

("[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself.").
23.
488 U.S. at 192.
24.
Id. at 193.
25.
Id. at 196.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 198.
28.
Id. at 198 n.19 (The Court noted that even though not being in the NCAA
would pose an obstacle to being a basketball powerhouse, that UNLV still had
options no matter how distasteful those options were).
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state. "29 Stevens then reasoned that it would be illogical to
conclude that the NCAA's imposition of sanctions against
UNLV is fairly attributable to the state of Nevada, especially
when the Attorney General steadfastly opposed the sanctions
during the long adversary proceedings held by the NCAA. 30

B.

Reasoning of the Dissent.

The dissent, written by Justice White and joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor, focused on whether the
private party acted jointly with the state actor in the harmful
conduct. The dissent concluded that on the facts of the case the
NCAA had acted jointly with UNLV and was therefore a state
actor in Tarkanian's suspension.

1. Prior Supreme Court rulings dictate that the test for the
present case be "whether the private party jointly engaged with
the state actors in the alleged violation. 1131
Justice White relied on Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 32 and
Dennis v. Sparks33 for precedent in holding that a private party "jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action"
becomes a state actor. 34 White argued that it is irrelevant
which party took the final step that caused the alleged harm.

2. The facts of Tarkanian clearly indicate that the NCAA
acted jointly with UNL V in Tarkanian's suspension.
The dissent found that in Tarkanian, "the NCAA acted
jointly with UNLV in suspending Tarkanian. "35 First, Justice
White noted that Tarkanian was suspended for violations of
rules made by the NCAA which were accepted by UNLV as a

29.
Id. at 199 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
30.
488 U.S. at 199.
31.
Id. at 200.
32.
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (plaintiff entitled to
relief under § 1983 against a private actor if he can prove that the private party
and a police officer had an agreement to cause their arrest on impermissible
grounds).
33.
449 U.S. 24 (1980) (The Court held that a private party became a state
actor when it willfully participated with a judge in the granting of an illegal injunction).
34.
488 U.S. at 200 (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28).
35.
488 U.S. at 200.
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condition to being a member of the NCAA.36 Second, he found
that UNLV was also forced to let the NCAA conduct hearings
concerning the violation of NCAA rules in order to be a member of the NCAA. 37 And third, UNLV had to agree that the
"findings of fact made by the NCAA at its hearings would be
binding on UNLV."36
In short, the dissent found that "it was the NCAA's findings that Tarkanian had violated NCAA rules, made at NCAA
conducted hearings, all of which were agreed to by UNLV in its
membership agreement with the NCAA, that resulted in
Tarkanian's suspension by UNLV."39 Based on these facts, the
dissent concluded that the NCAA was "jointly engaged with
[UNLV] officials in the challenged action, "40 and therefore was
a state actorY
IV.

ANALYSIS

This part of the note focuses on whether an agreement
between a state actor and a private party can change the private party into a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The first prong of § 1983 imposes liability on a party who violates an individual's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
while acting under color of state law. Tarkanian does not provide a clear standard for determining § 1983 liability of a private party where a state actor commits a violation pursuant to
an agreement with the private party.

A. UNL V Had No Reasonable Alternative Other than to Follow the NCAA's Findings and Recommendation to Suspend
Tarkanian; Therefore, UNL V Delegated its Authority to the
NCAA.
The Court found that UNLV was not contractually obligated to suspend Tarkanian on the findings and recommendations
of the NCAA, and therefore, UNLV acted unilaterally when it
suspended Tarkanian. 42 The Court noted, however, that if an
actual delegation of power to discipline individual employees of

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id. at 202.
Id. (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28).
488 U.S. at 202.
Id. at 192-94.
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member institutions had been contractually made to the
NCAA, then it would have been a state actor. 43
This view is too rigid and ignores the practical realities of
the case. Even though UNLV was not contractually obligated to
suspend Tarkanian, it had no legitimate alternative. The
NCAA had such power over its member institutions that UNLV
was forced to choose between suspending its head basketball
coach, Jerry Tarkanian, and having a basketball program at
all. Faced with the economic loss which would inevitably happen to any NCAA Division I institution if it were to lose one of
its major money-making sports (such as football or basketball),
UNLV acted in the only way feasible when it implemented the
NCAA's recommendations and suspended Tarkanian. UNLV
delegated its decision making authority regarding Tarkanian to
the NCAA because the school was effectively, if not literally,
bound by the NCAA's recommendations.

B.

UNL V's Action is Directly Attributable to the NCAA.

The majority in Tarkanian erred when it concluded that
the "'conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal
right' cannot fairly be attributed to Nevada since UNLV had
conducted its athletic program under policies adopted wholly by
the NCAA without any input from the state of Nevada. "44
Whether the state of Nevada was responsible for the
NCAA's rules and sanctions was irrelevant. Even though the
rules promulgated by the NCAA were not a result of Nevada
law, Tarkanian was deprived of federal rights pursuant to
NCAA rules. UNLV took action against Tarkanian that it otherwise would not have taken but for the NCAA's power over
UNLV's ability to operate major collegiate sports programs.
Thus, UNLV's action against Tarkanian should be attributable
to the will of the NCAA. Therefore, it's only fair that the NCAA
be considered a state actor since they essentially dictated Nevada state action.

43.
44.

Id. at 195.
Id. at 199 (quoting Lugar u. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. at 937).
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C. Public Policy Dictates that in Other Cases Arising Along
Similar Fact Patterns the Test Should be Whether the Private
Party Acted Jointly with the State Actor in the Harmful Conduct to the Individual.
Public policy suggests that the law should discourage private parties from acting jointly with state officials in conduct
that deprives individuals of federal rights. In Dennis v.
Sparks, 45 a state trial judge enjoined the production of minerals from oil leases owned by the plaintiff. The injunction was
later dissolved on appeal as having been issued illegally. The
plaintiff then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
the trial judge had conspired with the private party seeking the
original injunction -a private corporation-the sole owner of
the corporation, and the two sureties on the injunction bond to
deprive the plaintiff of due process by corruptly issuing the
injunction. The Court held unanimously that under these facts
the private parties were state actors because of their "willful
participation in joint action with the state or its officials. "46
In Dennis the trial judge was a more than willing party
with the private actors in the harmful conduct. In Tarkanian,
UNLV did not wish to take the harmful action but was forced
to do so because of the powerful position that the NCAA played
in relation to UNLV. Suppose that the trial judge in Dennis,
instead of happily acting in union with the private parties in
violating an individual's federal rights, had been blackmailed
into participating with the private parties. Is the private party
any less involved because the state actor is reluctant? If a private party becomes a state actor when it acts voluntarily with
a state actor in violating a person's federal rights, public policy
should be even stronger that a private party should also be
considered a state actor when it prompts an otherwise unwilling state actor to violate a person's federal rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

The reasoning of the Court in Tarkanian ignores realities,
precedent and public policy. It was a five-to-four decision. Such
decisions, have often been subject to later reversals by the
Court. However, the Court's current position is that a private

45.
46.

449 u.s. 24 (1980).
Id. at 27.
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party does not become a state actor when the state actor is the
one that takes the final act causing the violation of an
individual's federal rights. Therefore, unincorporated educational associations need to be aware of Tarkanian and its ramifications on § 1983 liability for them in instances where they
formulate rules and sanctions for member institutions.

Four Guidelines for Unincorporated Educational Associations to Best Limit Their Section 1983 Liability.

A.

Although there are no sure ways to ever completely limit
liability, there are some basic guidelines that Tarkanian gives
to unincorporated educational associations to greatly reduce
their§ 1983 liability to member institution's employees.

The association itself must riot be made up of member institutions from only one or a few states unless the association is
comprised of only private institutions.
1.

The Court in Tarkanian first considered whether the
NCAA and its rules could fairly be said to be the result of state
law. It found the NCAA was made up of numerous members
from a multitude of states and therefore the association or its
rules could not be deemed the law of any particular state. However, the Court noted the result would be the opposite if the
association was made up of member institutions from only one
state with most of the institutions being state actors themselves in their individual capacity. The Court did not indicate
what the result would be if the association was made up of
member state institutions from a small number of states. It
follows that the more states represented the better and the
fewer states represented the greater chance of having the association deemed a state actor.
Furthermore, if the organization was made up of only private member institutions it could not be deemed to be a state
actor in and of itself.

2. Unincorporated educational associations should not impose
sanctions on member institutions with regard to how those
institutions discipline their own employees.
Although the Court in Tarkanian found that the NCAA did
not become a state actor by threatening further sanctions if
UNLV did not suspend Tarkanian, the issue and subsequent
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litigation would have never occurred if the NCAA had simply
made the sanctions against UNLV itself and left it up to UNLV
to decide how best to discipline Tarkanian. On this issue educators need to remember that this was only a five-to-four majority that could easily be reversed if ever brought before the Court
again.

3. Unincorporated educational associations should not let
member institutions formally delegate power to the association
to take action directly against individual employees of those
institutions.
The Court noted in Tarkanian that the result would have
been the opposite if UNLV had formally delegated to the NCAA
the power to discipline UNLV employees directly. The Court
reasoned that if such a delegation had occurred, UNLV would
have been contractually obligated to discipline Tarkanian upon
the NCAA's findings and recommendations; therefore, the
NCAA could have been considered to have been a state actor.

4. Unincorporated educational associations should not take
the final action against member institution employees.
Finally, Tarkanian ultimately lost his case because it was
UNLV, the state actor, that suspended him and not the NCAA
(the private party). The decision in Tarkanian turned on the
Court's reasoning that when a state actor is the party that
causes the alleged harm, a private party cannot be considered a
state actor. It follows that the question of whether a private
party has violated an individual's federal rights under color of
state law is only necessary when the private party has in fact
taken the action that has caused the alleged harm. Therefore,
if the private party does not commit the act, the first requirement of the first prong of § 1983 is not met and whether the
act was committed under color of state law is irrelevant.
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